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NOTES
TIE CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY
(LIBERTAD) ACT OF 1996: ISOLATIONIST OBSTACLE
TO POLICY OF ENGAGEMENT
Michelle Arendt
"Of the proverbial thorns in the side of the United States, none has
irritated as long or sometimes as much as Cuba."
-L.D. Langley1
I. INTRODUCTION
THE UNrED STATES HAS OFTEN ADOPTED an "isolationist" approach
as a foreign policy mechanism to deal with nations engaging in undemo-
cratic and repressive practices.2 This isolationist approach is characterized
by a "hard-line" policy that uses economic sanctions in the form of trade
embargoes and reduces loans and economic aid to the targeted nation.'
Additionally, isolationist policy may involve severing diplomatic relations
with targeted nations.4 The intention of this type of foreign policy is to
B.A. University of Dayton (December, 1994); J.D. Candidate Case Western
Reserve University School of Law (1998). I would like to thank Professor Hiram
Chodosh, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, for his ideas and guidance
in writing this Note.
' Lester D. Langley, Cuba: A Perennial Problem in American Foreign Policy, in
FORUMS IN HISTORY 1,1 (Franklin D. Mitchell ed., 1973).
2 For example, the United States has adopted this approach with China, South
Africa, and Cuba. In a study done by the Institute for International Economics examin-
ing the history of sanctions in the twentieth century, researchers concluded the United
States was the dominant user of sanctions. This conclusion was based upon numbers
indicating that in 116 cases of sanctions being used in the twentieth century, the United
States was the "primary sender" in. seventy-seven of those cases. See The Gulf War:
The Law of International Sanctions, 1985 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 169, 171 [hereinafter
Law of International Sanctions] (remarks by Kimberly Ann Elliott); id. at 169 (remarks
by Barry R. Campbell).
' See John W. Smagula, Redirecting Focus: Justifying the U.S. Embargo Against
Cuba and Resolving the Stalemate, 2 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 65, 104 (1995).
' For example, shortly after Fidel Castro rose to power in Cuba, the United States
officially terminated diplomatic relations with Cuba. See MAX Azmcam, CUBA: POLMCS,
ECONOMICS AND Socamy 30 (1988). Additionally, as part of sanctions instituted against
China's government after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, the White House
suspended all official exchanges with China above the level of Assistant Secretary. See
251
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alienate the targeted nation so that it will feel pressured enough to make
changes in the policies, government structure, or practices to which the
United States objects. Although the United States has often favored this
approach, it has also often been criticized for it. The isolationist embargo
approach is not always successful in effecting changes of policy or
government within the targeted nations.5 Furthermore, these mechanisms
can result in imposing additional hardships on the people of the targeted
nation who may already have been suffering under a repressive govern-
ment.6
The U.S. relationship with Cuba provides an illustrative example of
the isolationist policy.7 For over thirty years, the United States has
estranged Cuba both economically and diplomatically with the intent of
destabilizing the Castro-led government in order to establish a more
democratic Cuban government. There has been much debate over whether
such a policy should be continued Despite criticism from within the
United States and censure from the global community,9 the United States
HARRY HARDING, A FRAGILE RELATIONSHIp THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA SINCE
1972 226 (1992).
' See Law of International Sanctions, supra note 2, at 174 (remarks by Kimberly
Ann Elliott).
6 See The Appropriateness of Continuing International Sanctions Against South Af-
rica, 84 AM. Soc'Y INT'L PRc. 307, 315 (1990) [hereinafter Appropriateness of
Sanctions] (remarks by Roger Wilkins) (discussing the response to concerns about how
sanctions were affecting the people of South Africa). See also HARDING, supra note 4,
at 267 (indicating concern for the smaller, privately owned industries that would be
hurt if the United States revoked China's Most Favored Nation trading status as a form
of economic pressure on China to improve its human rights conditions).
' See Shari-Ellen Bourque, Note, The Illegality of the Cuban Embargo in the Cur-
rent International System, 13 B.U. INT'L L. 191, 199 (1995).
' See Linda Robinson et al., Cuba Takes a Stiff Belt, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
July 29, 1996, at 36, 37. ("The debate over how best to change Cuba - more
investment that would bring more foreign influence or more isolation in hopes of
toppling Castro - has gone on for more than three decades"). See id. (noting that
recently, with the passage of the Helms-Burton Act, this debate has been generating
more heat).
" The United Nations General Assembly has condemned the United States for its
embargo against Cuba. See Julia P. Herd, Note, The Cuban Democracy Act: Another
Extraterritorial Act That Won't Work, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 397, 430 (1994),
available in WESTLAW, 20 BKNJIL 397. See also Avi Chomsky, Why Does the U.S.
Demonize Cuba?, MAINE SUNDAY TELEGRAM, Sept. 15, 1996, at IC. A spokesman for
the E.U. has stated: "We share a desire to see democracy in Cuba, but the Helms-
Burton Act, objectionable in principle, does not help cooperation." Reuters, Envoy Fails
to Sway E.U. on Anti-Cuba Laws, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Sept. 4, 1996, at
12A.
252 [Vol 30:251
CUBAN LIBERTAD ACT OF 1996
has continued to pursue its policy of isolating Cuba."
In March of 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act (Helms-Burton
Act)." President Clinton was originally opposed to the Helms-Burton
Act; however, early in 1996, the Cuban government piqued anti-Castro
sentiments by shooting down two unarmed U.S. aircraft. 2 That event
precipitated a compromise between Congress and President Clinton which
led to enactment of the Helms-Burton Act. 3 This legislation is the most
recent in a long line of actions the United States has taken to implement
its isolation policy against Cuba. 4 Proponents of the Helms-Burton Act
hope that it will resolve the long-standing dispute between the United
States and Cuba over expropriated property taken by the Cuban govern-
ment and initiate democratic reforms within the Cuban government.'5
The Helms-Burton Act is based upon isolationist tactics and attempts to
compel other nations to cooperate with the U.S. efforts in Cuba. Critics
of the Helms-Burton Act argue that its isolationist approach will not be
successful in achieving U.S. goals in Cuba and, furthermore, that it will
be costly to U.S. interests. 6 Opponents to the U.S. approach, as pursued
through the Helms-Burton Act, urge the United States to pursue a policy
of engagement with Cuba rather than isolation in order to achieve U.S.
goals in Cuba with less costs to U.S. interests.
,0 This continued pursuit of isolation is evidenced by the recent passage of the
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton
Act), 22 U.S.CA. §§ 6021-6091 (West Supp. 1997), and is the focus of this Note.
" See id. The Act is commonly referred to as the Helms-Burton Act for its two
sponsors, Republican Senator Jesse Helms and Representative Dan Burton, and it will
be referred to as such herein.
12 See Bruce W. Nelan, Taking on the World, TIME, Aug. 26, 1996, at 26.
,3 See Memorandum from Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton on the Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act 1 (March 12, 1996) [hereinafter Cleary,
Gottlieb] (on file with the editors); Robinson, supra note 8, at 36; 142 CONG. REC. 30,
E308, (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1996) [hereinafter Rep. Reed] (statement of Rep. Jack Reed
of Rhode Island).
' See, e.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a) (1994); Trading
With the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(B) (1994); Cuban Assets Control Regulations,
31 C.F.R. § 515 et. seq. (1996); Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. § 6001-10
(1996).
" The Helms-Burton Act establishes a law under which United States expropriation
victims may sue to obtain compensation for their expropriated property. The Helms-
Burton Act also conditions relief from the embargo upon initiation of reforms in the
Cuban government and upon active steps to repay U.S. citizens for their expropriated
property. 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6061-6085.
16 See Rep. Reed, supra note 13, at E308.
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This Note advocates that U.S. policy toward Cuba should move away
from the isolationist approach, as exemplified by the Helms-Burton Act.
The United States should pursue engagement of Cuba, as other nations
have,17 through investment and commerce, as well as more direct com-
munications between the two governments. Part H1 briefly describes signif-
icant factors of the Cuban Revolution that created the hostile relations
between the United States and Cuba stemming from isolationist policy.
Part III discusses the Helms-Burton Act as a tool of isolationist policy.
Title II of the Helms-Burton Act, which allows U.S. citizens to sue
foreign corporations for benefitting from the use of expropriated property,
deserves particular attention due to its extraterritorial implications and the
angry reaction it has provoked from U.S. allies. Part IV examines the
validity of the Helms-Burton Act under international legal principles. Part
IV also discusses the shortcomings of the Helms-Burton Act and its
detrimental impact on U.S. interests. Finally, Part V discusses engagement
as an alternative means for the United States to work toward democratic
reforms in Cuba that better serve U.S. interests. In order to enhance the
discussion on engagement, Part V compares the Cuban problem to the
problems in U.S. relations with both South Africa and China.
U1. BACKGROUND
In 1953, Fidel Castro launched the Cuban Revolution against the
Batista military government."8 Fidel Castro became Prime Minister of
Cuba's revolutionary government on February 16, 1959."9 During the
"7 See, e.g., Merrill Goozner, U.S. Law Fails to Scare Canada Firms Out of Cuba,
Cm. TRIB., June 16, 1997, at 4 (noting that trade and tourism between Canada and
Cuba surged 11% last year to $641 million (Canadian)).
"8 See AzicRi, supra note 4, at 24. Batista had been elected President of Cuba in
1940 under a constitutional government process he had helped to initiate. However, the
1940 Constitutional government ended after only twelve years because in March, 1952,
Batista successfully carried out a military coup and established a military government.
Batista's coup obstructed the Cuban People's Party (Ortodoxo), which Castro belonged
to, from becoming the leading political party in the June, 1952 elections. Castro, who
opposed the Batista government, launched a revolution which ultimately succeeded in
defeating the Batista regime and taking power on January 1, 1959 when Batista and his
family fled the country. See id. at 23-25.
"' See id. at 29. Although it is not clear that the Cuban Revolution originally
intended to establish a socialist system, particularly one that followed Marxist-Leninist
theory, it quickly advanced in that direction. See also Wayne S. Smith, U.S.-Cuba
Relations: Twenty-Five Years of Hostility, in CUBA: TwENTY-FivE YEARS OF REvOLU-
TION, 1959-1984 333, 334-35 (Sandor Halebsky & John M Kirk eds., 1985) (stat-
ing,"[d]espite what he says today, Castro was not a Marxist-Leninist when he came to
power"). But cf. AZICRi, supra note 4, at 29 (stating that while Revolutionary Cuba's
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years prior to the Revolution, the United States dominated Cuba with its
economic presence.' The United States intervened in Cuban affairs both
politically, through military occupation, and economically, through U.S.-
driven monopolies' Cuba relied upon the United States not only for
trade, but also for capital investment.'
The Revolutionary government not only made adjustments to the
dependent nature of its economy through domestic policies, but also
through foreign policy. One of the revolution's primary goals was to
liberate Cuba from its economic dependence on the United States. In
response to the revolution, the United States cut Cuba's sugar quota in
the U.S. market to nothing.' Meanwhile, the Cuban government institut-
ed a policy of collectivization that involved nationalizing property that
belonged to Cubans and to foreign interests. Some of the nationalized
property belonged to U.S. citizens In addition to the antagonistic effect
these expropriations generally had on U.S.-Cuban relations, they also
created numerous claims made by U.S. citizens, seeking compensation
from the Cuban government for the property taken from them.
At this point relations between the two nations were severed when,
in January of 1961, President Eisenhower's administration ended both
diplomatic and consular relations with Cuba.' As a result of these
first and short-lived President of seven months made public statements about "the men-
ace [C]ommunism could represent for the people's welfare and the revolution," other
revolutionary leaders such as Castro "were thinking and planning quite differently"). By
1961 Castro had publicly declared a socialist revolution. See Smith, supra, at 337.
See Smith, supra note 19, at 333.
2, See id. See also AzicRi, supra note 4, at 37 (citing BOORSTEIN).
" See AZICRi, supra note 4, at 36-37 (outlining the U.S. influence on pre-Revolu-
tionary Cuba). The United States owned 36.65% of Cuba's sugar mills as of 1958.
These American-owned mills were expropriated by the Cuban government. See id. at
166.
2 See id.
24 See id. at 127-29.
' U.S. citizens may file claims against foreign governments for expropriated prop-
erty under the authority of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 22 U.S.C
§§ 1621-1645 et. seq. (1994), and through the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
(FCSC). The FCSC is a branch of the Department of Justice, and its function is to
determine the amount and validity of claims against foreign governments. Title V spe-
cifically authorizes the FCSC to certify claims against the Cuban government. See
Smagula, supra note 3, at n.9. The number of original claimants against Cuba certified
under the FCSC totals 5,911. See The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of
1995: Markup on HR. 927 Before the Committee on International Relations, 104th
Cong. 18 (1995) [hereinafter Markup on H.R. 9271 (statement of Ms. Patterson).
' See AzICRu, supra note 4, at 30.
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hostile relations between the United States and Cuba, combined with eco-
nomic pressure exerted by the United States and its allies on Cuba, the
Cuban Republic was forced to look elsewhere to establish economic
ties Those ties were made with the Communist Soviet Union.H The
Soviet Union supplied Cuba with commercial trade and significant
economic aid."
The issues raised by the Helms-Burton Act arise from the policy that
the United States adopted regarding Cuba in the wake of the revolution,
one it has continued to maintain over the past thirty-five years. The
policy is based upon the U.S. goal to isolate Cuba from the global
community. The primary means the United States has used in attempting
to effect this policy of isolation has been economic sanctions in the form
of trade embargoes enacted and enforced against Cuba."
An economic embargo was first enacted under the Kennedy Adminis-
tration.3 In 1963 Congress enacted the Cuban Assets Control Regula-
tions (CACRs) as a means to closely monitor restrictions on "almost all
commercial, financial, or trade transactions, either direct or indirect, with
Cuba by persons within the United States."32 Two decades later, the
7 See id at 210; see also Smith, supra note 19, at 337.
See AziCRi, supra note 4, at 210. See also Smith, supra note 19, at 337.
See AZICRI, supra note 4, at 153. In fact, trade and economic aid from the
Soviet Bloc have been a critical factor in the Cuban Republic's survival. See id. at
153-55 (estimating figures on how much economic aid and trade had been supplied by
the Soviet Bloc from the early years of the Cuban Republic through the mid-1980s).
" Other covert means have included military operations, such as when the United
States sent CIA-trained Cuban exiles to invade Cuba in the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Id. at
31. See also SHELDON B. LISS, FIDEL! CASTRO'S PoLITIcAL AND SOCIAL THOUGHT
100, 101 (1994) (noting that the Bay of Pigs invasion in April, 1961 is only one of
the more blatant examples of numerous plots to undermine the Castro regime). About
one and a half years following the Bay of Pigs invasion, the United States was thrown
into crisis when Castro allowed the Soviet Union to place nuclear missiles in Cuba
where they would be at close range to the United States. See AZICRI, supra note 4, at
31.
The United States, however, was not the only nation to economically sanction
Cuba. The Organization of American States (OAS) imposed multilateral diplomatic and
economic sanctions, in addition to suspending Cuba's membership in the OAS in 1962.
See Smith, supra note 19, at 337, 340. The United States, however, has been the most
adamant about sustaining and enforcing economic sanctions. Even though in 1975 the
United States voted with the majority in the OAS to end the multilateral sanctions, the
United States did not withdraw its own unilateral embargo. See id. at 340.
3' See AZICRI, supra note 4, at 213.
32 Herd, supra note 9, at 399-401. The CACRs implemented the trade restrictions
by requiring exporters to obtain an export license from the Department of Treasury. See
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Reagan Administration continued to strictly enforce the embargo 3
With the end of the Cold War, Cuba lost its Soviet economic aid. 4
This loss of aid caused a significant decline in the Cuban economy3
Reports give different numbers and measure different components of the
economy, but the bottom line is that Cuba's economy suffered.' The
economy has experienced some recovery, but it is still in poor condi-
tion. 7 The weak position of the Cuban economy has been viewed by the
U.S. government as an opportune time to pursue its policy of bringing
about an end to the Castro socialist system and authoritarian government
in order to establish a capitalist, democratic government?
id. at 401.
"' See AZICRI, supra note 4, at 122. Additionally, the Reagan Administration
supplemented its anti-Castro policy with efforts to have Cuba condemned in the United
Nations Human Rights Commission for human rights violations. See id. at 214. The
Reagan era has been viewed as one of the most tense periods in United States-Cuban
relations. See Smith, supra note 19, at 348-49 ("[The Reagan Administration] adopted
a policy of inflexible hostility toward Cuba.. . . Indeed, under the Reagan administra-
tion, U.S.-Cuban relations reached perhaps their lowest point since the open conflict at
the Bay of Pigs and the near cataclysm of the missile crisis"). See also AziCRI, supra
note 4, at 212 (noting the "unproductive hostility" of the Reagan Administration).
' See Bourque, supra note 7, at 192. See also Kevin Fedarko, Open for Business,
TIME, Feb. 20, 1995, at 50.
s See Bourque, supra note 7, at 192. See also Fedarko, supra note 34.
3 See David Adams, Cubans See Light at End of Dim Economic Tunnel, ST. PE-
TERSBURG TIMES, July 28, 1996, at 2A [hereinafter Cubans See Light]. See also 22
U.S.C.A. § 6021(1) (West Supp. 1997) (Congressional Findings).
' See Cubans See Light, supra note 36. Cuban officials reported economic growth
of 9.6% for the first half of 1996. Exports rose 30% and imports rose 50% in that
same time period. These are Cuba's official figures, but some economists are skeptical
of them. See id. Cuba's purchasing power had fallen from 1989-1993 from importing
$8.3 billion to $2.1 billion, but started to increase again to $2.4 billion in 1995. See
id.
'3 See, e.g., Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. § 6001(6) (1996). This Act
is consistent with the longstanding United States policy regarding Cuba. It continues
attempts to force economic and political reform in Cuba by erecting barriers to Cuba's
ability to conduct necessary international commerce. Building upon already existing
prohibitions on United States' domestic trade with Cuba, the Cuban Democracy Act
extended the prohibitions to foreign subsidiaries owned or operated by United States
nationals. It forbids American firms, wherever they are incorporated or located, from
conducting financial or commercial transactions with Cuba. The Cuban Democracy Act
angered many foreign nations that resented the United States extraterritorially applying
its trade practices. See Herd, supra note 9, at 397. See also Allen DeLoach Stewart,
Comment, New World Ordered: The Asserted Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the Cuban
Democracy Act of 1992, 53 LA. L. REv. 1389 (1993).
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In light of the progression that U.S. policy has followed for over the
past thirty years, the provisions of the Helms-Burton Act are not shocking
proposals. After already prohibiting domestic trade with Cuba,39 and
extending that restriction to U.S.-owned or U.S.-controlled businesses that
are located and incorporated in other nations,' the next logical step by
the United States was to prevent foreign-owned businesses and investors
from conducting transactions with Cuba. What may be considered shock-
ing, however, is that Congress proceeded to enact the Helms-Burton
provisions in the face of strong objections from the international com-
munity, thereby placing U.S. foreign relations with its closest allies at
risk.41
I. THE CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDAR=TY (LIBERTAD)
ACT
A. Title I
The effective purpose of the Helms-Burton Act is to reinforce the
economic embargo against Cuba42 and thereby undermine Castro's gov-
ernment. The Helms-Burton Act is a legislative expression of the U.S.
isolationist approach. Title I of the Helms-Burton Act reaffirms the U.S.
economic embargo of Cuba.' It reasserts the existing measures in effect
under the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and the CACRs.44 The Helms-
Burton Act even takes the embargo a step further by codifying the eco-
nomic embargo45 so that, under the terms of the Helms-Burton Act, the
3 See Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.201 (1996).
, See Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. § 6005(a)(1). See also Herd, su-
pra note 9, at 406-07 & n.44.
4, See Paul Magnusson, Uncle Sam Isn't Playing Fair with the WTO, Bus. WK.,
Mar. 10, 1997, at 38. Even more shocking is the extreme measures the United States
appears willing to take in order to pursue the policies enacted in the Helms-Burton
Act. U.S. officials threatened to boycott the World Trade Organization's hearing on the
E.U.'s complaint regarding the Helms-Burton Act. See id.
4 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6031-6046. For stylistic purposes I will refer throughout the text
to subchapters I, II, II, and IV as Title I, II, 111, and IV, respectively. This is how
the four subchapters have been more popularly referred to in commentary on the
Helms-Burton Act.
4 Id. § 6032.
See id. §§ 6032(a),(c).
41 Id. § 6032. The Helms-Burton Act defines the "economic embargo on Cuba" to
include all restrictions on trade, transactions, and travel with Cuba that have been
imposed through section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C.
§ 2370(a) (1994); appendix section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C.
app. § 5(b) (1994); The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010
(1994) and any other provisions of law. Id. § 6023(7). The codification of the embargo
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President cannot lift it without consulting Congress and determining that
a transitional government is in power in Cuba.' Title I also encourages
the President to apply sanctions against other countries that provide assis-
tance to Cuba. 7 Title I includes a request for the President to instruct
the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to
propose to the Security Council a mandatory international embargo
against Cuba.'
The Helms-Burton Act seeks not only to deny Cuba access to the
U.S. economy, but also to isolate Cuba from the international economy.
Additionally, the Helms-Burton Act opposes Cuba's membership in any
international financial institution.49 Moreover, if any of these financial
institutions approve a loan or other assistance to Cuba, the United States
threatens to withhold payment, in the same amount of such loan or
assistance, to the institution.s
B. Title II
Those who support the Helms-Burton Act hope that Cuba will
eventually establish a democratically elected government. Title II of the
Helms-Burton Act represents the goals that the United States is working
toward in Cuba. The Helms-Burton Act states that one of its purposes is
"to assist the Cuban people in regaining their freedom and prosperity as
well as in joining the community of democratic countries that are flour-
ishing in the Western Hemisphere."' While Title 11 encourages the
Cuban people to "empower" themselves, 2 Title I outlines U.S. plans to
continue a policy of isolating Cuba and crippling its economy. Specifical-
ly, Title II presents a number of incentives to encourage the Cuban
additionally includes all restrictions imposed through the Cuban Assets Control Regula-
tions. See id. § 6032(c).
4 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6032(h), 6064. Prior to Helms-Burton, the economic embargo of
Cuba was implemented by the U.S. Department of the Treasury and through Executive
Orders. See Cleary, Gottlieb, supra note 13, at 2. There are indications, however, that
the President may still have discretion to modify the embargo because the Helms-
Burton Act continues to empower the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of
Foreign Assets Control to issue licenses allowing exceptions for people to engage in
activity otherwise prohibited by the embargo. See id.
4 22 U.S.C.A. § 6032(a).
Id. § 6031(2).
Id. § 6034(a).
5o See id. § 6034(b).
51 Id. § 6022(1).
52 Id. § 6061(3).
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people to pressure its government to comply with U.S. demands.53 Title
II offers the Cuban people assistance which would be available to Cuba
once it establishes a transitional government.' The assistance will consist
of humanitarian, developmental, and other economic aid, as well as
assistance in implementing a democratically elected government 5
The point at which Cuba is deemed to have established the desired
system to warrant the assistance is determined according to criteria
outlined in Title II. These criteria are rather extensive and would impose
sweeping changes upon Cuba. To obtain the assistance promised in the
Helms-Burton Act, Cuba would have to make dramatic reforms including:
releasing all political prisoners; allowing human rights organizations to
make inspections; dissolving the current Department of State Security;
making public commitments to organize free elections; moving toward
freedom of the press and right to private property; and beginning efforts
to either return expropriated property or provide compensation to U.S.
citizens from whom such property was taken.' Few commentators dis-
agree with these goals; however, the radical changes required by these
standards are unrealistic, at least in the short term. Therefore, the ambi-
tion of these aspirations may undermine progress toward change in Cuba
rather than facilitate it.'
C. Title III
Through the Helms-Burton legislation, Congress attempts to seal
Cuba off from U.S. commerce and from non-U.S. commerce as well. The
Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 asked foreign governments to cooperate
with the U.S. policy by restricting their trade and credit relations with
Cuba." Title Im of the Helms-Burton Act subjects those governments
and foreign corporations who do not voluntarily cooperate with the United
States to civil suits in U.S. courts 9
This third set of provisions indicates a concern for the property
rights of U.S. citizens.' ° Many U.S. citizens have a stake in sorting out
3 ld. §§ 6061-6067.
I d. § 6062.
SS See id.
Id. §§ 6065-6067.
It has been suggested that expecting too much from Cuba and not offering
enough in return contributed to failed attempts in the past to improve U.S. relations
with Cuba. See Smith, supra note 19, at 349.
s See Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. § 6003(a) (1996).
59 22 U.S.C.A. § 6082 (West Supp. 1997).
0 See id. §§ 6081-6085.
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their claims over lost property in Cubae 1 The remedy provided in Title
I grants U.S. citizens a right to sue in U.S.'courts, thus claimants have
easy access to a forum where they can assert their claims. This remedy,
however, is only available to those whose claims involve an amount in




A closer look at specific provisions in Title I indicates that obtain-
ing compensation for victims of Cuba's expropriation practices is a
peripheral goal of Title HI and the Helms-Burton Act as a whole.' The
underlying purpose of Title I is to enforce, on an international level, the
U.S. policy of economically isolating Cuba. Evidence of such intent is
found throughout the language of the Act. Congress states in its Title I
findings:
"[Tirafficking" in confiscated property provides badly needed financial
benefit, including hard currency, oil, and productive investment and
expertise, to the current Cuban government and thus undermines the
foreign policy of the United States... to bring democratic institutions
to Cuba through the pressure of a general economic embargo at a time
when the Castro regime has proven to be vulnerable to international
economic pressure.'
In effect, the Helms-Burton Act serves as a warning to those foreign
nationals who would offset the effects of the U.S. embargo by investing
in Cuba. To understand the controversy over Title III, it is important to
notice that the burden of compensation for the expropriation victims falls
upon foreign nationals acting contrary to U.S. policy. Although the Act
61 See Robinson et. al., supra note 8, at 37. Reports say the number of United
States nationals with claims in Cuba that have been certified by the Foreign Settlement
Claims Commission is 5,911 claims, worth over five-billion dollars. See id. In addition
to the certified claims that are on file with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission,
Title I of the Helms-Burton Act requires the United States Secretary of State to sub-
mit a report to Congress including an estimate of the number and value of claims ex-
isting that are not certified. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6067.
See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6082(b). This clause has provoked criticism from those who
point out that a property owner had to have been "very rich to have owned anything
of that value in Cuba in 1959," so that poorer property owners who suffered loss due
to expropriation do not derive any benefit from this provision. See Rep. Reed, supra
note 13, at E309 (containing excerpt from the WASHINGTON POST)..
' Recognizing the "real" purpose of Title Hl does not make the Act, or any of the
secondary goals asserted by its provisions, necessarily underhanded or illicit. Rather,
such recognition enables a better understanding of the implications that stem from the
means chosen to achieve the primary purpose.
22 U.S.C.A. § 6081(6).
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clearly blames the Castro government for wrongfully taking property and
causing loss to its owners,' under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act,
Castro and his government are not held accountable. Of course, the
Castro government is ultimately the target of this legislation, yet it is
only through pressure exerted upon third-party nations that Castro will
feel the effects of it.
The persons identified as potential defendants in Title II suits are
those who "traffic" in property "confiscated" by the Cuban government
on or after January 1, 1959. The Act defines "trafficking" broadly,
encompassing a wide range of activities connected to the expropriated
property, including selling or managing it, as well as profiting through the
trafficking of another person.' For purposes of the Helms-Burton Act,
"confiscated" refers to property nationalized, expropriated, or seized by
the Cuban government on or after January 1, 1959, for which adequate
and effective compensation has not been given.'
Congress notes in its findings that the State Department has notified
foreign governments of the complications that would arise in trying to
return the expropriated property to its original owners if the property is
in the hands of third parties.' In addition to the notice that passage of
the Act provides, the provisions themselves provide a three-month "grace
period" from the date Title mH becomes effective, during which potential
defendants can dispose of their interests in the controverted property and
Id. § 6081(3).
Id. § 6023(13). See also Summary of the Provisions of Title III of the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LTBERTAD) Act of 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,955
(1996). Trafficking does, however, require a knowing and intentional state of mind. 22
U.S.C.A. § 6023(13). See also Summary of the Provisions of Title Ell of the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. at 24,955.
'7 22 U.S.C.A. § 6023(4). Currently, there is no uniform agreement among nations
as to what constitutes appropriate compensation for expropriation of foreign property.
However, the United States advocates the position that the appropriate compensation is
"just' or "full" compensation. Just compensation under the Restatement (Third) of The
Foreign Relations Law of the United States means an amount equivalent to the value
of the property taken and paid at the time of the taking or within a reasonable time
afterward with interest from the time of the taking. The United States also advances
the position that the value of the land should be evaluated as either the fair market
value or the going concern value. See Tim Gebert, The Principles of Just Compensation
For International Takings, 4 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 389, 394 -97 (1995). Although the
Helms-Burton Act does not specifically define the standard for "adequate and effective"
compensation, based on the U.S. position in the international debate on appropriate
compensation, the standard is likely to be measured in terms of just or full compensa-
tion.
S See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6081(7).
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avoid liability.'
The costs of ignoring pending liability are great. The amount for
which an investor may be found liable is not based upon the benefits
gained from use of the confiscated property. Instead, liability is measured
as being whichever is greatest of three possible amounts: (1) the amount
of the claim as certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission;"0
(2) an amount determined by a court-appointed special master,7" or (3)
the fair market value, calculated as being either the current value of the
property or the value of the property when confiscated plus interest,
whichever is greater.' In certain circumstances liability may be tripled
where either the claim is certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission, or the claimant has sent official notice of intent to initiate
the action under Title III and the defendant investor continues to traffic
in the disputed property.'
President Clinton successively suspended enactment of Title IH1 for
two six months periods,74 pursuant to a provision in Title 1iH that grants
him this suspension power.75 Until the suspension expires, claimants
hoping to finally receive compensation for their loss of property will have
to wait to file their claims.
D. Title IV
Title I provides both a means to discourage investment in Cuba,
and a remedy for those who have had their property expropriated; how-
ever, it is also a remedy that will take time, as it works through the court
system. Title IV, which has already been put into effect,76 is a more
immediate mechanism to encourage cooperation by other nations. This
provision of the Act requires the United States Secretary of State to deny
Id. § 6082(a)(1).
0 The FCSC certifies claims according to statutory procedures. See supra note 25.
The court-appointed special master may be the FCSC so that the same statutory
procedures would apply. See id.
' Any of the three amounts used to measure the liability also additionally include
interest, court costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6082(a)(1).
Id. § 6082(a)(3).
74 See Dennis Bueckert, Clinton Delays Cuba Sanction Again, MONTREAL GAZEvr,
Jan. 4, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL 4603972. Reports on the April, 1997 U.S.-
E.U. agreement say the President will continue to suspend enactment of Title I for
the duration of his Presidency. See Tom Buerkle, Bitterness Over U.S.-E.U. Trade Deal
Proves It a Truce, Not a Settlement, INT'L HERALD TRM., Apr. 15, 1997, at 6.
75 See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6085(b).
76 See Maya Bell, Expatriates Police Helms-Burton Violators, SUN-SEaNTnE (Fort
Lauderdale), Aug. 5, 1996, at 6.
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visas to any foreign national who deals in property in Cuba that is
subject to a claim by a U.S. national 7 This restriction also applies to
people who work for corporations that have business dealings in Cuba
involving land subject to expropriation claims.78 Because Title IV was
put into effect soon after passage of the Helms-Burton Act and not
suspended like Title III, it has been the source of much contention
between the United States and its allies. 79
IV. PROBLEMS OF THE HELMS-BURTON ACT
Even prior to its passage, the Helms-Burton Act was the subject of
controversy. The Act may seem to be just another piece of legislation in
a long line of isolationist legislation dealing with Cuba; however, in light
of the new climate that exists since the end of the Cold War, the hard-
line approach the Helms-Burton Act takes toward Cuba and U.S. allies
warrants critical examination.' Concerns have been raised over the
extraterritorial aspects, with opponents pointing to the lack of authority
the United States has to prescribe behavior of foreign persons or cor-
porations outside of U.S. territory.81 Third-party nations oppose the
legislation, especially Title I, as being an unacceptable infringement on
their sovereignty.' Additionally, there are concerns as to whether the
Helms-Burton Act will be effective, or if it will raise more problems than
it is worth in terms of foreign relations disputes,' U.S. trading opportu-
nities" and hardships on the Cuban citizenry.'
See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6091.
See id.
See E.U.U.S.: European and American Officials Clinch Deal to End Cuba Row,
EUR. REP., Apr. 16, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8516486. In the spring of 1997, the
U.S. State Department had already alerted over 20 European businesses that they were
in violation of the Helms-Burton Act, which could subject them to Title IV sanctions.
See id.
' One comment made distinguishing the Helms-Burton Act from other instances of
United States policy notes, "Why all the uproar? Isn't it business as usual for countries
to enforce their views on the world, and doesn't the U.S. regularly throw its superpow-
er weight around? Yes, Washington often berates other countries, promises benefits or
denies privileges to get its way. But the Helms-Burton law ... [is] something
different. [It] threaten[s] to punish private individuals outside the U.S. who do not obey
laws passes by Congress." Nelan, supra note 12.
", See David Adams, A Fragile Truce on Cuba, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 27,
1997, at 5D [hereinafter Fragile Truce]; John Rice, Mexico Concerned by U.S.-Europe
Pact over Helms-Burton Act, Assoc. PRESS, Apr. 18, 1997, available in 1997 WL
4862734.
See Rice, supra note 81.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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A. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
The suspensions of Title III have been attributed to pressure from the
international community.' Even before the Helms-Burton Act was
passed, foreign officials conveyed strong opposition, organizing lobbying
efforts against the legislation's enactmentY Foreign officials contend that
the Helms-Burton Act amounts to an extraterritorial effort to impose U.S.
policy on other nations in violation of international law.' In this respect,
the Helms-Burton Act is similar to the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992.
The Cuban Democracy Act, which was motivated by the same anti-Castro
policy, also was protested vigorously on grounds that it violated interna-
tional law by legislating extraterritorially.89 One complaint leveled against
the Cuban Democracy Act is that the United States has no valid basis to
assert jurisdiction over the foreign subsidiaries it seeks to regulate.' The
same charge has been made over the Helms-Burton Act, this time in
regard to the foreign investors Congress is attempting to regulate.9'
There is no specific legislative body that codifies all the international
legal principles that are binding upon every nation. Rather, international
law is based upon custom, treaties or conventions, and general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations.' Customary international law has
identified five bases for prescriptive jurisdiction, including: (1) territorial;
(2) national; (3) universal; (4) protective; and (5) passive personality.'
Territorial jurisdiction is the most common and non-controversial
basis for prescriptive jurisdiction.9' This theory of jurisdiction recognizes
85 See discussion infra Part IV.F.
See Anthony Wilson-Smith, Clinton's Concession, MACLEAN'S, July 29, 1996, at
14.
See id.
" See Steven L. Myers, Clinton Troubleshooter Discovers Big Trouble from Allies
on Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1996, at Al.
' See Herd, supra note 9, at 407.
9' See id. at 428-29.
9' See Nelan, supra note 12.
n See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060
(1945). See also Abraham Abramovsky, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The United States
Unwarranted Attempt to Alter International Law in United States v. Yunis, 15 YALE
J. INT'L L. 121, 122 (1990).
9 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, § 402 (1986). See also
United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340, 1344 n.6 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Herd,
supra note 9, at 410-12.
9 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 93, § 402
cmt. c.
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that "each sovereign nation has the right to exercise jurisdiction and
control over matters within its territory."'95 Since none of the investment
activity the Helms-Burton Act seeks to regulate occurs within U.S.
territory, this theory cannot provide a basis for jurisdiction under the
Helms-Burton Act. Third party nations protesting the Helms-Burton Act
base their opposition to the Act upon the theory of territorial jurisdiction
and its related concepts. One of these concepts is territorial integrity,
which gives a state "the right to demand that other states refrain from
committing acts that violate the independence or territorial supremacy of
that state." The other concept is nonintervention, which "requires that
a state not interfere with the internal or external affairs of another
state." By attempting to prohibit foreigners from investing in Cuba,
Congress is interfering with the internal and external affairs of other
states, infringing upon their territorial integrity.
The other four theories of jurisdiction are considered exceptions to
the basic territorial principle based on extraterritorial principles.98 Nation-
ality jurisdiction, the second theory of jurisdiction, gives nations juris-
diction over their own nationals, wherever they are located." In as much
as the Helms-Burton Act seeks to extend U.S. prohibitions to foreign
nationals and enforce its policies against persons who are not its own
nationals, it does not rely on the nationality theory of jurisdiction.
The third theory of jurisdiction is universality. The universal theory
is inapplicable to the Helms-Burton Act as well. This theory allows any
nation to exercise jurisdiction over individuals who commit heinous acts
that are universally condemned." While expropriation without compen-
sation is viewed unfavorably by some nations, it has not been condemned
as a heinous act.'
95 Herd, supra note 9, at 410.
'6 Id. at 411.
97 Id.
'" See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 93, § 402
cmt. b; Herd, supra note 9, at 411; Stewart, supra note 38, at 1393-94.
99 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 93; Herd,
supra note 9, at 411.
" See United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340, at n.6. (S.D. Fla, S.D.
1981); Herd, supra note 9, at 412. Acts that have been recognized as heinous enough
to warrant universal jurisdiction include piracy. See James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. at
1344 n.6, and torture, see In Re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights
Litigation, 32 I.L.M. 106, 111-13 (9th Cir. 1992).
0 See Gebert, supra note 67, at 390. In fact, international law recognizes the right
of nations to expropriate property for public purposes. Debate regarding expropriations
centers on the degree of compensation, not upon whether it actually should be given.
See id.
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The fourth theory of jurisdiction is called the protective principle.
The protective principle grants a nation jurisdiction over a foreign nation-
al when that person's actions are directed against the security of the
state." This principle also fails to provide a basis for jurisdiction for
the Helms-Burton Act.
The remaining theory of jurisdiction, passive personality principle, is
applicable to the Helms-Burton Act; however, it fails to provide any
recognized authority for extraterritorial jurisdiction exercised under the
Helms-Burton Act. The passive personality principle "asserts that a state
may apply law ... to an act committed outside its territory by a person
not its national where the victim of the act was its national."103 In pass-
ing the Helms-Burton Act, Congress is trying to apply its laws to transac-
tions taking place outside of the United States, between nationals that are
not its own, based on the premise that these transactions will affect U.S.
nationals who have claims to property involved in the transactions. Thus,
the Helms-Burton Act fits within the passive personality principle of
jurisdiction.
However, reaching that conclusion does not establish a valid jurisdic-
tional basis for the Helms-Burton Act, as passive personality jurisdiction
is considered somewhat dubious, at best, within international law. "The
international community has not, by and large, accepted passive personali-
ty jurisdiction except as applied to terrorism - and that form of jurisdic-
tion may resemble protective or even universal jurisdiction more than
passive personality jurisdiction."" The United States joins the interna-
tional community in not ratifying passive personality jurisdiction, except,
perhaps, in cases of terrorism. 05 In United States v. Columba-Colella,
' See Herd, supra note 9, at 412.
" RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 93, § 402 crmt.
g.
'0 Geoffrey R. Watson, The Passive Personality Principle, 28 TEx. INT'L LJ. 1, 13
(1993). Watson concedes that some nations have statutes that grant extraterritorial
jurisdiction over crimes committed against their nationals. However, he asserts that these
statutes are rarely exercised, so that any limited practice of passive personality
jurisdiction would not be enough to amount to a rule of customary international law.
See id. at 13-14. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States acknowledges that the passive personality principle is not widely recognized for
ordinary torts or crimes; although, it is gaining acceptance in cases of terrorism or
assassination of state officials. See id. at 10; RESTATEMENT ('HmD) OF FORE-GN RELA-
TIONS LAW, supra note 93, § 402 cmt. g.
"o See Watson, supra note 104, at 11 C"[Olutside of terrorism, however, the United
States still seems reluctant to embrace passive personality jurisdiction."). See also
James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. at 1344 n6 ("[P]assive jurisdiction exists in theory ...
but this concept has been generally rejected as a basis of jurisdiction in Anglo-
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the Fifth Circuit explicitly rejected the passive personality principle as a
sufficient basis to assort jurisdiction over a foreign national."° In its
opinion, the court stated, "But that an act affects the citizen of a state is
not a sufficient basis for that state to assert jurisdiction over the act."' 7
In cases where the courts have recognized passive personality jurisdiction,
there have either been extenuating circumstances or one of the other four
types of jurisdiction was primarily relied upon."u
In sum, although arguments can be made in support of the validity
of passive personality jurisdiction, they are only convincing as to terror-
ism, if at all. The Helms-Burton Act does not involve criminal activity,
so it does not fall within the acceptable scope of passive personality
jurisdiction.
B. Legal and Diplomatic Conflicts
The trade embargo approach Congress has taken toward Cuba by
passing the Helms-Burton Act is often used to pursue U.S. interests;"°
however, it is at the cost of relations with many other nations, both
legally and economically. Helms-Burton Act opponents in the United
States expressed concern in congressional committee sessions over interna-
tional reaction to the Act's passage.' Moreover, U.S. business execu-
American law"). For an example of passive personality jurisdiction used to prosecute
terrorist activity, see United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
'0 604 F.2d 356, 359 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that United States district court
lacked jurisdiction over an action based upon defendant's agreement, made in Mexico,
to sell a stolen car that belonged to a U.S. citizen).
107 Id. at 360.
"o See Abramovsky, supra note 92, at 124. Such extenuating circumstances include
crimes of conspiring to assassinate a U.S. congressman or other U.S. officials. See iL
at 124-26 (referring to United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Cal), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981) and United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1137 (1985)).
"o In fact, there appears to be an increasing trend of using sanctions in U.S. foreign
policy to address problems ranging from human rights abuses and terrorism to drug
trafficking and environmental concerns. A recent report from the National Association
of Manufacturers calculates 61 Congressional laws and executive actions enacted within
the last four years against 35 countries for the purpose of punishing and changing the
behavior of the targeted nations. See Jim Lobe, U.S.-Trade: Corporations Mount Anti-
Sanctions Campaign, INTER PREss SERv., Mar. 5, 1997, available in 1997 WL
7073989; Nancy Dunne, Trade Sanctions Are Hurting U.S. Business, Congress Is Told,
FiN. TRMEs, Mar. 5, 1997, at 4.
1' See, e.g., Markup on H.R. 927, supra note 25, at 20 (testimony of Mr. Weiner,
attorney-advisor in the office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Dept. of State) (stating that
the Title m mechanism for resolving claims with Cuba would "put us at odds with our
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tives and associations have launched an anti-sanctions campaign, criticiz-
ig legislation such as the Helms-Burton Act for jeopardizing the status
of U.S. businesses in the global marketplace."' Several nations, angered
by the extraterritorial jurisdiction the United States has asserted over their
nationals, have taken steps to protest the Act beyond just the mere
expression of opposition."'
U.S. allies have been infuriated by the threat of legal action their
businesses face under the Helms-Burton legislation for conducting busi-
ness in Cuba."' The United States has faced retaliatory measures from
several nations including the European Union (E.U.), Mexico and Canada.
These measures have included "anti-boycott" legislation approved by the
European Commission that makes it illegal for E.U. companies to comply
with the Act and also grants companies the right to counter-sue in
European courts."4 Beyond these efforts to hinder enforcement of the
Helms-Burton Act, nations also have taken actions to attack U.S. trade.
The E.U. has been working on compiling a "blacklist" or "watchlist" of
U.S. companies who file suits against European businesses and has been
threatening to deny visas to representatives of those U.S. companies."5
Initial diplomatic missions sent by President Clinton to placate U.S.
trading partners were not successful." 6 Tensions continued to exist...
As anticipated, after Clinton's re-election in November of 1996, trading
partners put increased pressure on the President to suspend Title Im for
a second period."' With the trading costs at stake, this pressure was not
easily disregarded."9 Despite President Clinton's decision to suspend
allies').
. See Lobe, supra note 109.
2 See infra text accompanying notes 113-130 (discussing retaliation measures).
3 See Bueckert, supra note 74.
11 See U.S.-E.U. Trade War Unlikely to Erupt, SING. STRAIrS TIMEs, Aug. 17,
1996, available in 1996 WL 11720157. See also David Fox, E.U. Strikes Back at
Washington's Anti-Cuba Law, THE HERALD (Glasgow), July 31, 1996, at 12, available
in LEXIS, News Library (noting new proposals by the European Commission making
it illegal for European companies or individuals to cooperate with any suits brought
under the Helms-Burton Act).
"' See Nelan, supra note 12; see also Fox, supra note 114; U.S.-E.U. Trade War
Unlikely to Erupt, supra note 114.
116 See Myers, supra note 88, at Al. During one diplomatic trip to Mexico, United
States official Stuart Eizenstat was pelted with eggs. See id.
117 See id.
11' See id. Some even say that Canada entertains beliefs that Clinton will postpone
Title Ell enactment permanently. See Wilson-Smith, supra note 86.
9 In 1995, E.U. exports to the United States totaled $137 billion (U.S.), and U.S.
exports to the E.U. were $124 billion (U.S.). See U.S.-E.U. Trade War Unlikely to
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Title III a second time, U.S. allies continued to object to Helms-Burton
as holding a sword over them." °
In addition to domestic measures, U.S. allies have taken their opposi-
tion to the Helms-Burton Act to an international level. Canada contem-
plated filing a challenge to the Helms-Burton Act under the North
American Free Trade Agreement,12' but postponed proceeding with any
action until E.U. efforts to negotiate with the U.S. unfolded." In No-
vember of 1996,"2 the E.U. initiated an action under the World Trade
Organization (WTO), which was scheduled to be formally presented to
the hearing panel on April 14, 1997."2 The contention over the Helms-
Burton issue escalated to a point where commentators feared that the
WTO could be put at risk." 5 In response to the E.U.'s complaint, the
United States argued that the WTO was not the proper body to consider
the Helms-Burton issue because it is a political, foreign policy matter, not
a trade issue. " The United States threatened to ignore any WTO ruling
on the grounds that the matter is one of national security, and therefore
inappropriate for WTO consideration."n Additionally, the United States
also threatened to boycott the WTO hearing altogether."n Both of these
actions would have established a negative example to other nations
involved in WTO proceedings and could have resulted in seriously
undermining the authority of the fledgling organization. 9 Moreover, the
Erupt, supra note 114.
" See Bueckert, supra note 74.
121 See id.
"2 See Lawrence Herman, Canada Should Sit Tight as Helms-Burton Saga Unfolds:
U.S. and E.U. May Agree on a Face-Saving Deal, FIN. PosT, Apr. 23, 1997 at 17,
available in 1997 WL 4092893.
23 See E.U. Formally Tells WTO to Suspend Cuba-U.S. Trade Dispute, Dow JONES
NEWS SERV., Apr. 21, 1997, available in WESrLAW, AllNewsPlus.
124 See id. The World Trade Organization is an international organization created in
1995 to settle trade disputes. See Magnusson, supra note 41. The WTO delayed
appointing a three-member hearing panel in hopes that the E.U. and the United States
would reach a settlement agreement about the Helms-Burton Act outside of the WTO
Dispute Body. When no agreement was reached, the WTO proceeded in appointing the
panel to hear the E.U.'s complaint against the United States. See id.; Cuba: U.S.-
Europe Move Towards Deal Over Cuba, CARIBBEAN UPDATE, May 1, 1997, at 7-8.
,2 See Magnusson, supra note 41.
,2 See id.
2 See U.S. to Cite 'National Security' for Helms-Burton, SuN-SENnTNEL (Ft. Laud-
erdale), Feb. 25, 1997, at 8A, available in 1997 WL 3089658.
,2 See Magnusson, supra note 41.
229 See id. Even if the United States insists on continuing the Helms-Burton law, it
is not necessary to rebuff the WTO in order to do so. Should the WTO rule against
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United States, who has filed more complaints with the WTO than any
other nation, could have jeopardized its own position in proceedings
based upon U.S. complaints of foreign market barriers."'
The United States did not carry out these threats, and the authority
of the WTO remains in tact, because three days before the formal WTO
hearing the United States and the E.U. reached a tentative agreement.
131
As part of the two-page "understanding," the E.U. suspended its WTO
complaint. 3 1 In exchange, the United States promised to further suspend
Title M for the duration of Clinton's presidency and to seek U.S. Con-
gressional approval to amend the Helms-Burton Act.133 The amendment
sought by the E.U. would provide the President with power to waive the
Title IV provisions which deny visas to foreign investors who are in-
volved with disputed property in Cuba." Another significant term of
the agreement was a commitment by both the E.U. and the United States
to try to negotiate a common policy on property, seized by Cuba's
Communist government. 35 October 15, 1997, was set as the deadline for
these negotiations." s The goal of these negotiations was for the parties
to develop rules for dealing with investments in expropriated property that
can be extended globally through the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development."
Responses to the agreement varied.' Some critics pointed to the
the United States, it cannot force the United States to repeal the Helms-Burton
legislation. It can only levy a monetary fne. See id.
'" See Magnusson, supra note 41.
13, See R.W. Apple, Jr., Split Over Cuba is Eased by U.S. and Europeans, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 12, 1997, at Al; Administration to Seek to Amend Helms-Burton Act
Trade: Tentative Compromise with European Allies Attempts to Avoid International
Legal Fight Over Sanctions Against Cuba, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1997, at Dl.
' See Buerkle, supra note 74.
See id.; E.U.1U.S.: European and American Officials Clinch Deal to End Cuba
Row, supra note 79.
"34 See id..
135 See idU
"3 See id. See also Buerkle, supra note 74. Negotiations regarding the Helms-Burton
issue were not completed as of the October 15, 1997 deadline. See Anne Swardson,
U.S., E.U. Make Trade Strides, But Fail to Reach Settlement, WASH. POST, Oct. 16,
1997 available in 1997 WL 14707495. Nevertheless, the United States and the E.U.
have continued efforts to reach a compromise to the dispute without involving the
WTO. See U.S., E.U. MEET ON IRAN, CUBA TRADE FIGHTS, Dow Jones Int'l News
Serv., Nov. 21, 1997, available in WESTLAW, 11/21/97 DJINS 16:57:00.
' See Buerkle, supra note 74.
' See id. (discussing strong reservations to the agreement as expressed by France,
Spain, Italy, Belgium, and Luxembourg before the agreement was ultimately approved
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vague language of the agreement and expressed doubts that it would be
successful." 9 Indeed, since the provisions of the Helms-Burton Act were
created by Congress, amending it would not be within President Clinton's
power. Any amendment to the Helms-Burton Act would be subject to
Congress's decision."4 There was also some confusion on how strong
of a stance the E.U. members would take against their own companies
who make future investments in Cuban property.'4' Other critics of the
agreement worried that it would be successful, at least in terms of
avoiding a WTO decision on the matter. 42 These critics were disap-
pointed because while there was the potential for a WTO ruling against
the United States and a trade war with the E.U., there was also the
potential for the United States to be forced into changing its policy
toward Cuba and third-party nations that deal with Cuba. 43
The United States may have to change its policy anyway, in order
to continue avoiding WTO proceedings. Sir Leon Brittan, the E.U. Trade
Commissioner, has insisted that if the United States does not satisfy its
commitments under the April agreement, the E.U. would renew its com-
plaint with the WTO.' In light of the stand-off that will likely occur
between the United States and the E.U. if the United States fails to alter
its policy toward third-party nations, it would be worthwhile both diplo-
by the E.U. Member States).
,3 Robert White, a former U.S. ambassador and director of the Washington-based
Center for International Policy, stated, "I don't think you can square the circle. You
can't satisfy Helms and Europe." Fragile Truce, supra note 81.
'" See id. At the time of the April agreement, members of Congress would not say
whether they agree to amending the Helms-Burton Act. Although Eizenstat, the
administration's official charged with handling Helms-Burton Act matters, said he had
won broad support in Congress for the April agreement, Senator Helms stressed that he
"in no way agreed to any dilution of the Helms-Burton law" and will "carefully
examine any proposed deal that is reached." See Administration to Seek to Amend
Helms-Burton Act Trade, supra note 131.
... U.S. officials have said that European nations were to take action to "inhibit"
their companies from buying state-seized property in Cuba, while European officials
have talked about measures merely to "discourage" such buying. See Administration to
Seek to Amend Helms-Burton Act Trade, supra note 131. In April, following the U.S.-
E.U. agreement, France signed an agreement with Cuba designed to protect French
investment interests in Cuba. See Trade Accord with Cuba is Signed, CHl. TuB., Apr.
27, 1997, available in 1997 WL 3543059.
" See Buyers Heed After E.U.- U.S. Deal, EMERGING MARKERS REP., May 8, 1997,
available in WESTLAW, AllNewsPlus; U.S. Can Escape Curse of Cuba, SING. STRArrS
TIMES, Apr. 29, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7210534.
'' See Buyers Heed After E.U.-U.S. Deal, supra note 142.
'" See Buerkle, supra note 74. But see supra note 136.
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matically and economically for the United States to make some conces-
sions to E.U. demands. Another alternative, should the Clinton Adminis-
tration be unable to persuade a Republican Congress to amend the Helms-
Burton Act, would be to submit to the WTO hearing and abide by its
findings. 45 A WTO ruling condeming the extraterritorial Helms-Burton
Act provisions would provide a strong incentive for Congress to amend
the law, without giving the appearance that Congress is conceding to a
Democratic Presidential administration. For Congress to defy a WTO
ruling and refuse to make amendements would result in embarrassment to
the United States and could cause the United States to be an unwelcome
member of the WTO."'
An additional concern raised by U.S. parties opposed to the Helms-
Burton Act is that of reciprocity. If foreign nations were to adopt similar
laws, on the grounds that what is a legal mechanism for the United States
is also a legal mechanism for others, U.S. investors abroad would face
serious risks. Unless they could be assured of the ownership of property
involved in their foreign investments, they could face the same type of
suits as those designed under Title I."4 Similarly, reciprocal legislation
could be used to scare away foreign investors from the United States.1"
C. Business Interests Sacrificed
Not only has the Helms-Burton Act led to potential legal barriers
against U.S. businesses in third party nations, 49 it also reinforces do-
mestic legal barriers that preclude U.S. businesses from entering a viable
Cuban market. It has been estimated that when the Cuban embargo is
' See U.S. Can Escape Curse of Cuba, supra note 142.
4 See id.
' See Markup on H.R. 927, supra note 25, at 19-20.
' A hypothetical example would be if Canada, one of the strongest opponents to
the Helms-Burton Act, were to pass legislation granting certain legal rights to Native
Americans who become Canadian citizens. Canada could allow these naturalized
Canadian citizens to sue corporations over use of land that once belonged to Native
Americans but was expropriated by the United States.
" See supra notes 114, 115, 121-24, 147, 148 and accompanying text (discussing
retaliation measures initiated by U.S. allies). Beyond the retaliation legislation and the
blacklists, sanctions may hurt U.S. businesses in a more general manner by damaging
their credibility within the global marketplace. U.S. business people complain that the
tendency for the United States to readily impose sanctions "give[s] American businesses
the stigma of being unreliable." Lobe, supra note 109. As a report issued by. the
National Association of Manufacturers explains, "Foreign companies and governments
are understandably reluctant to enter into any long-term commercial relationship with
U.S. companies if the threat of sanctions looms." Dunne, supra note 109.
"5 See Fedarko, supra note 34. While some reporters indicate that most U.S.
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finally lifted, U.S. business could total as much as one billion dollars in
the first year. 5 ' Currently, American businesses are forced to forego
hundreds of business opportunities, while foreign businesses take advan-
tage by establishing trade and investments in Cuba without having to
contend with U.S. competition.5 2 Cuba presents economic potential for
U.S. businesses in several areas including tourism, mining, telecommuni-
cations, and textiles.5 3 In the meantime, the embargo not only remains
in place, but has been tightened by the Helms-Burton Act.
D. Ineffective Mechanisms Undermine Ultimate Goals
Considering the breach of international legal principles attributed to
the Helms-Burton Act, along with the conflict it has raised in the interna-
tional community,"5 one would hope it will be worth all the trouble it
has created. Unfortunately, many doubt that it will accomplish transition
to democracy in Cuba or procure adequate and satisfactory compensation
for expropriation victims. 55 The approach taken toward Cuba in the
Helms-Burton Act, while perhaps more extreme in terms of international
legal implications than in the past,'56 is not a new approach. Economic
sanctions have been used against Cuba for over thirty years; s however,
Castro remains in power. At the time of the Cuban Democracy Act of
1992 critics were against that legislation which sought to tighten the
embargo at the cost of overstepping international legal bounds.' Con-
gress, nevertheless, proceeded to enact the legislation, claiming it was
companies are not interested in trade with Cuba, others indicate that there has been
enough interest to prompt some companies to visit Cuba to start building potential
business relationships and even to sign nonbinding letters of intent. See id.
'5, See id.
152 See id. One Canadian company admitted, "A company of our ilk would never
have the opportunity if we had to compete with American capital." Id.
,.. See id. See also Bourque, supra note 7, at 206 (noting that Cuba is rich in
natural resources, offering an abundance of investment opportunities).
,"' See supra Part IV.A-B.
,53 See Rep. Reed, supra note 13, at E308; Markup on H.R. 927, supra note 25, at
13-15, 19-20 (statements by Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Weiner). See also Tom Carter,
Marxist Foe of Cuban Leader Says U.S. Policies Play into Dictator's Hands, WASH.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 1997, at A17; James W. Symington, Why Not Smother Them with
Cruise Ships?, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1997, at C3.
' See Cuba and U.S. Policy: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the W. Hemi-
sphere on Int'l Relations House of Representatives, 104th Cong. 45 (1995).
'' See Bourque, supra note 7, at 196-97; Smagula, supra note 3, at 66.
,s' See Trevor R. Jefferies, Comment, The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992: A Rotten
Carrot and a Broken Stick?, 16 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 75, 92-97 (1993).
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necessary to achieve the policy goals in Cuba.159 The fact that new
legislation has been passed in follow-up to the 1992 Act indicates the
1992 legislation was not successful in achieving its desired effects on the
Cuban economy or on Fidel Castro's leadership position. Many com-
mentators feel that the 1996 legislation, which is based on the same
policy, will not fair any better."6
Persons from all parties contend that it will not do any better.
Congressman Jack Reed, in trying to persuade his colleagues to oppose
the Helms-Burton Act, argued:
How best to hasten the end of the Castro regime? Regrettably, the bill
before us is not the answer. Isolation has not been successful in ending
the Cold War, and, indeed, it was not the course of action which




Even the President of Cuba's legislature commented, "One of the
United States' objectives is... development of a market economy...
[e]verything in the Helms-Burton law conspires against the opening of the
market in Cuba."'
Because many of the U.S. trading partners do not agree with the
Helms-Burton sanction approach, the United States must proceed with
sanctions in a unilateral fashion without international support. Many feel
that unilateral sanctions are less likely to succeed than multilateral
sanctions.Y If third party nations continue their economic relations with
Cuba, they will help to maintain Cuba in the face of the U.S. embar-
go. 164
'- See id.
160 But see Lobe, supra note 109 (reporting on plans of a major foreign investor to
pull out of Cuba due to the Helms-Burton law).
6 See Rep. Reed, supra note 13, at E308.
262 Robinson, supra note 8, at 37 (quoting Ricardo Alarcon, president of Cuban
legislature).
" See Dunne, supra note 109 (stating that unless sanctions have broad multilateral
support they are largely ineffective). See also Law of International Sanctions, supra
note 2, at 172-73 (remarks by Kimberly Ann Elliott) ("[S]anctions tend to be most
effective ... [w]hen the sender and the target are friendly toward one another and
conduct substantial trade ... [sluccess for individual sender countries increasingly
depends on the subtlety, skills, and creativity with which sanctions are imposed - a
test that the United States has frequently failed").
'" See Law of International Sanctions, supra note 2, at 173 (remarks by Kimberly
Ann Elliott). See also David M. Lampton, Greater China and American Security, in
GREATER CHINA AND U.S. FOREIGN PoLIcY: TmE CHOIcE BETWEEN CONFRONTATION
AND MUTUAL REsPECT 55, 64 (Thomas A. Metzger & Ramon H. Myers eds., 1996)
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The insistence by the United States to continue the embargo is
actually counterproductive'65 because it provides the Castro government
more fuel to add to the anti-American fire that keeps Cubans supporting
Castro. " Advocates of Helms-Burton who believe maintaining the em-
bargo will hasten the end of the Castro government overlook Fidel
Castro's ability to manipulate the embargo to his benefit.67 By blaming
Cuba's economic woes on the U.S. embargo, Castro is able to incite the
Cuban people's anger away from himself and against the United
States."s
E. Elusive Compensation Hopes For Expropriation Victims
In addition to doubts expressed over the likelihood that the Helms-
Burton Act will affect change in Cuba, there have also been doubts ex-
pressed over whether Title IT will actually bring the relief that is hoped
for by expropriation victims who file suits under Title ]II." ° Any com-
pensation that claimants do receive will likely take a long time to be
determined due to massive numbers of claims that will have to be
adjudicated in over-burdened courts.' With the likelihood that the
number of claims will increase beyond the original number of claims
existing under the Foreign Settlement Claims Commission, there is
concern that the amounts due on valid original claims will be diluted in
order to satisfy the large demand of so many claimants.'
While Title I may result in some compensation going to claimants,
the cost of that compensation will be borne by foreign investors, not the
Cuban government. This creates a perverse incentive for the Cuban
government to stall any negotiations with the U.S. government regarding
a settlement agreement to obtain compensation for claimants from the
(discussing that other nations would not follow sanctions-based approach to Chinese
human rights violations, thus contributing to the failure of U.S. sanctions against
China).
"6 See Reginald Dale, U.S. Sanctions Fad Cries for Restraint Thinking Ahead, INT'L
HERALD Tam., Feb. 25, 1997, at 11.
' See Jefferies, supra note 158, at 93.
167 See Fedarko, supra note 34.
' See Symington, supra note 155; Lobe, supra note 109.
,6 See Markup on H.R. 927, supra note 25, at 18-19 (statements of Mr. Patterson);
Rep. Reed, supra note 13, at E308.
"7 See Markup on H.R. 927, supra note 25, at 13-15 (statements of Mr. Hamilton);
Wilson-Smith, supra note 86 (discussing the "potential scale" of Title I actions); Rep.
Reed, supra note 13, at E309.
" See Markup on H.R. 927, supra note 25, at 13-15.
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Cuban government." With Title III the Cuban government can sit back
while claimants recover from foreigners, so that Cuba itself will not have
to pay for the property it expropriated."n
F. Moral Concerns
Opponents of the Helms-Burton Act, and the Cuban embargo in
general, have expressed concerns that restricting the inflow of goods and
other economic resources into Cuba will not hasten democratic reforms or
better circumstances for the Cuban people. Instead they fear it causes the
Cuban people to suffer more hardship.74 Cuban dissidents argue that the
isolationist policy of the United States hurts the Cuban people because it
serves as a pretext for the Cuban government to justify itself in carrying
on a repressive government. 75 In fact, some dissidents have reported an
increase in repression since the passage of the Helms-Burton Act. 76
Lea Brilmayer, a law professor, has observed that the end of the
Cold War brought about an increased level of security that changes the
role of the United States.'" The greater security that the United States
enjoys now that the threats of the Cold War have dissipated, afford the
nation greater freedom to act in a moral fashion. Brilmayer writes:
Just as the end of the Cold War gave us room to act consistently with
our basic moral principles, it also gave us greater responsibility .... It
might have been an excuse at one time that a nation to which we
refused assistance had someplace else to look - specifically the Soviet
Union .... When Cubans had another source of aid and trade, our
efforts to cut them off were more understandable... the United States
is now in ... a monopoly position. Some of our representatives in
Washington seem to take this as an invitation to tighten the noose
further. It should be taken as the opposite . .. . The fact that the
United States is sometimes the only game in town gives rise to respon-
17 See id.
See id.
See Bourque, supra note 7, at 194, 227. A student who travelled to Cuba as a
part of a university-sponsored course on Cuba wrote of the experience, "I have seen
what the (U.S. embargo) means to the public. It means that AIDS patients are dying
because of a medicine which is only produced in the U.S. and is unable to get to the
dying patients." Chonsky, supra note 9.
'7- See Carter, supra note 155.
176 See id.
"77 See Lea Brilmayer, Transforming International Politics: An American Role for the
Post Cold War World, 64 U. CIN. L. REv. 119, 133-34 (1995).
' See id. at 134.
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sibilities that did not previously exist."
According to Brilmayer's theory, the United States may have a moral
responsibility to refrain from pursuing the isolationist policy exemplified
in the Helms-Burton Act, because the United States is in the best position
to help Cuba in its time of economic trouble.
V. ALTERNATIVE - ENGAGEMENT OF CUBA
A policy of gradually re-engaging in relations with Cuba presents a
viable alternative to the U.S. policy of isolation. Accommodation between
the United States and Cuba is not an impossibility. There were periods of
limited gains in U.S.-Cuban relations in the past." These attempts
failed to achieve any lasting success in improving U.S.-Cuban relations
because the United States expected too much, too soon.'8 ' This all-or-
nothing attitude, which continues in the Helms-Burton Act, sought to
force Cuba into making concessions to the United States before the
United States would give reciprocal reassurances.
The third party nations that have been so critical of the Helms-
Burton Act do agree with the United States that the Cuban system needs
changes, but they clearly feel that the U.S. policy of isolation is not the
way to effect such changes." Canada's International Co-operation Min-
ister, Pierre Pettigrew, stated, "We share with the Americans the wish to
see Cuba become more democratic-although we obviously do not share
the American view as to the means of achieving that."m
The theory underlying engagement is that once Cubans are exposed
to U.S. products and ideas they will be more likely to see the problems
with their own system and initiate reform on their own.' Opponents to
the sanctions approach feel that the presence of American business people
in non-democratic nations will serve as a positive influence toward dem-
ocratic reform." Cuban dissidents also favor engagement over the
179 Id.
"o See AZICRI, supra note 4, at 212. Under the Carter Administration some limited
gains were made toward engagement with Cuba, including: (1) opening Interest Sections
in each nation's capital in 1977 to replace the embassies that had bein previously with-
drawn; (2) U.S. citizens were permitted to travel to Cuba; (3) the Dialogue Conference
in November and December of 1978 which took place between the Cuban-American
community and the Cuban government; (4) Cuban Americans were allowed to visit rel-
atives who remained in Cuba. See id.; Smith, supra note 19, at 344-45.
"' See Smith, supra note 19, at 349.
"u See Wilson-Smith, supra note 86.
1 Id.
4 See Jefferies, supra note 158, at 93-94.
" See Lobe, supra note 109; Nancy B. Zucker, China: Most-Favored-Nation Treat-
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Helms-Burton approach, believing that more open relations between the
two nations will "erode Castro's ideological base and the institutional
support required to maintain it."'"
To gain a better understanding of why engagement is a beneficial
alternative to isolationist embargoes, a comparison between Cuba and
other nations that the United States has sanctioned, or has considered
sanctioning, would be helpful.
A. South Africa
The case of South Africa is one of the few instances in which
opinions indicate sanctions were effective.Y The United States officially
instituted its most comprehensive sanctions against South Africa in 1986
under the 1986 Anti-Apartheid Act. Proponents of the Helms-Burton
Act could argue that since the economic sanctions approach worked in
South Africa, South Africa serves as an example of why the Cuban
embargo should be continued. In support of such an argument, they could
point out that prior to the 1986 Anti-Apartheid Act, the U.S. policy
toward South Africa was that of "constructive engagement."' 89 In 1986,
the U.S. Congress overrode President Reagan's veto of the sanctions
legislation which resulted in replacing Reagan's constructive engagement
policy with the sanctions policy.19
However, such an argument ignores distinguishing factors that exist
between the South Africa case and the Cuban case. The first factor is that
U.S. sanctions against South Africa were imposed in cooperation with
international multilateral sanctions. 9' The Helms-Burton legislation is a
ment and U.S. Policy on the Chinas (Capitol Hill Session), 87 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 432, 438 (1993) [hereinafter China MFN Policy] (statement by John C. Danforth
(R-Mo)).
"' Symington, supra note 155, at C3. See also Carter, supra note 155.
187 See Gene Marlowe, Economic Sanctions Results Often Puny, Seldom Punitive,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 8, 1997, at Cl; China MFN Policy, supra note 185,
at 440 (remarks by Sen. Danforth) (indicating that while he believes as a general rule
that economic sanctions do not have positive effects, the case of South Africa varies
from that general rule).
" See Appropriateness of Sanctions, supra note 6, at 313-14 (remarks of Donald
Payne).
'"' See Peter C. Nwachukwu & Mfanya D. Tryman, Constructive Engagement and
South Africa: A Critical Assessment-1981-1985, in APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA AND
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 103 (Mfanya D. Tryman & Zuberi L Mwamba eds., 1987).
" See Appropriateness of Sanctions, supra note 6, at 313 (remarks by Donald
Payne).
"9 See Carter, supra note 155.
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unilateral action on the part of only the United States."9 The impact of
multilateral versus unilateral makes a difference in effectiveness."9
Secondly, internal factors within South Africa differed from the
internal factors present in Cuba. There was mass mobilization of the
South African population against the Apartheid regime, which added
internal pressure in addition to the external pressure of sanctions."9 The
dissidents in South Africa were not worried that they would suffer as a
result of sanctions; rather, they actively called for the international
community to continue sanctions." In contrast, within Cuba there is
little organized opposition to the Castro regime." The dissidents who
do remain in Cuba express opposition to the Helms-Burton Act and U.S.
sanctions."9 The dissidents prefer to see dialogue between the United
States and the Castro government along with the opening of economic
relations.9
In light of these distinguishing factors, the embargo policy as it
transpired in South Africa is not applicable to Cuba.
B. China
The U.S. relationship with China provides a more relevant example
for dealing with the Cuban problem. Similar to the goals the United
States has regarding Cuba, the United States seeks a transition in the
Chinese government from an authoritarian communist regime to a demo-
cratic, free-market system."9 This goal of democratization includes both
economic and political reforms. The debate among U.S. foreign policy
makers has been whether such reforms are best achieved through sanc-
tioning China or through constructive engagement of the Chinese govern-
ment . ' Despite the horror of the Tiananmen Square massacre in
1989,21" the Bush Administration adopted a policy of continued con-
19 See id.
193 See supra notes 163, 164 and accompanying text.
' See Appropriateness of Sanctions, supra note 6, at 309, 313 (remarks by Jennifer
Davis).
See id. at 315 (remarks by Roger Wilkins).
' See Fedarko, supra note 34; Symington, supra note 155.
'9 See Symington, supra note 155; Carter, supra note 155.
'g See Symington, supra note 155; Carter, supra note 155.
"9 See Morton Kondracke, Engagement is the Right Strategy for U.S. with China,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 3, 1997, at B7. See also China MFN Policy, supra note 185.
See Kondracke, supra note 199; China MFN Policy, supra note 185.
201 In May of 1989 students began staging pro-democracy protests in Beijing. These
protests gained widespread support as laborers, journalists, and other citizens travelled
to Beijing to join in the demonstrations. The demonstrators filled the streets and
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structive engagement under which the United States maintained political
and economic ties with China.'°2 Most significant in the constructive
engagement policy has been annual renewal of China's Most-Favored-
Nation (MFN) trading status, which has continued under the Clinton
Administration 3
Under the policy of engagement with China, the United States has
benefitted from economic relations with China. From the time of normal-
izing relations with China in 1979 to 1993, the value of U.S.-Chinese
relations has increased from $4 billion to $25 billion .' As of 1993,
China was the tenth largest export market for the United States, and it
has become the fastest growing market for U.S. goods.' 5 As China
occupied Tiananmen Square in the heart of the city. In response, the Chinese govern-
ment declared martial law. On the night of June 3, the Chinese government, in an
effort to suppress the pro-democracy movement, ordered the People's Liberation Army
to take military action and quash the demonstration. The soldiers opened fire on the
demonstrators, killing and wounding thousands. This event is known as the Tiananmen
Square massacre. See Harding, supra note 4, at 222-24.
See id. at 224-25. Immediately after the Tiananmen Square massacre, President
Bush did impose a series of sanctions on China including: warnings to U.S. citizens
not to travel to China; suspension of military sales and exchanges; requests to interna-
tional financial institutions to postpone all lending to China; suspension of all official
communications with China above the level of Assistant Secretary; and sympathetic re-
views of requests by Chinese students in the United States who wished to delay their
return to China. While President Bush did impose these sanctions, he was against any
stronger actions that could isolate China. In order to avoid isolating China, Bush
attempted to maintain relations through direct phone calls to Chinese officials and
through continuing civilian commerce. See id. at 225-27, 229.
' See Robbyn Reichman-Coad, Human Rights Violations in China: A United States
Response, Note, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 163, 179-83 (1994). In each of
the three years following the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, Congress attempted
to either revoke China's MFN status or condition it upon certain human rights
improvements. These attempts failed due to President Bush's veto of the legislation and
lack of Congressional majority sufficient to override the presidential veto. See id. See
also Harding, supra note 4, at 260-80. In 1993, President Clinton issued an executive
order conditioning renewal of China's MFN status on improvement of China's human
rights record. However, a year later, in 1994, Clinton decided to renew China's MFN
status despite little progress in its human rights policies. Additionally, Clinton declared
that future renewals would no longer be linked to human rights conditions. See
Reichman-Coad, supra at 185; Nicholas Lardy, U.S.-China Economic Relations, in
GREATER CHINA AND U.S. FOREIGN PoLicy: THE CHOICE BETWEEN CONFRONTATION
AND MUTUAL RESPECt 65, 71 (Thomas A. Metzger & Ramon H. Myers eds., 1996).
See China MFN Policy, supra note 185, at 433 (remarks by Robert T. Matsui).
See Lardy, supra note 203, at 71. Calculation of China as the tenth largest
export market includes goods first sold to Hong Kong and then reexported to China.
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emerges as an increasing world power in terms of econornics,2it is
making advances toward a more accessible and free-market economy.
Unfortunately, at the same time the Chinese Communist Party is
fostering economic development, it is refusing to change its political
system.' Human rights violations have continued in China since
Tiananmen Square, despite the Chinese Government's claims to have
taken steps to rectify their human rights problems.' China's continued
violation of human rights has perpetuated the debate over China's MFN
status.21 ° While revoking MFN trading status is not as severe as a full
trade embargo, such as is in place against Cuba, it would have a serious
impact on commercial relations between the United States and China.!
Revoking China's MFN status would subject Chinese goods entering the
U.S. market to vastly higher tariffs, resulting in a dramatic reduction of
Chinese exports to the United States." 2
Currently, the Clinton Administration is continuing to engage in
relations with China and has not revoked its MEN trading status."3 The
arguments against revocation of China's MFN status parallel arguments
made against the Helms-Burton Act and the Cuban embargo.
The major arguments against denying China MFN status are based
on economic concerns. If the United States denies China MFN status,
China will respond in kind by denying the Untied States MFN status for
U.S. exports to China.2"4 With loss of MFN status, the United States
Nicholas Lardy argues these transactions should be calculated in measuring China's
value as an export market. See id.
' See Thomas A. Metzger & Ramon H. Myers, Introduction to GREATER CHINA
AND U.S. FOREIGN PoLicy: THE CHOICE BETWEEN CONFRONTATION AND MUTUAL
RESPEcT 1, 19 (Thomas A. Metzger & Ramon H. Myers eds., 1996). In 1993 China
was surpassed only by the United States as a recipient of direct foreign investment. See
Lardy, supra note 203, at 65.
' See China MFN Policy, supra note 185, at 443 (remarks by William P. Alford);
Reichman-Coad, supra note 203, at 186.
' See China MFN Policy, supra note 185, at 443 (remarks by William P. Alford);
Reichman-Coad, supra note 203, at 186.
' See Reichman-Coad, supra note 203, at 163-77, 185-86. See also George Black,
Perspective on China, L.A. TRMES, Mar. 10, 1997, at B5.
2"' See Kondracke, supra note 199. See generally China MFN Policy, supra note
185.
2. See Harding, supra note 4, at 260.
212 See id. Estimates have predicted the reduction of Chinese exports to the United
States could be as much as fifty percent. See id.
113 See Kondracke, supra note 199.
2' See China MFN Policy, supra note 185, at 438 (statement by Sen. John C.
Danforth).
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will be forced to forfeit a large part of its share in the Chinese market,
thereby leaving room for foreign competitors to take over that market.2 15
Since third party nations are unlikely to follow the United States in
denying China MFN status, foreign businesses will benefit from economic
opportunities that U.S. businesses will be foreclosed from enjoying.216
This competitive advantage is currently enjoyed by foreign businesses
investing in Cuba who do not have to contend with U.S. competition due
to the Cuban embargo. 7
A second argument raised against revoking China's MFN status is
that it will hurt the very people it is intended to help.21 8 Reducing Chi-
nese exports to the United States would result in hurting the small-scale
private and collective industries developing in China rather than the large,
state-owned industries that produce goods that remain for sale mainly
within the domestic China market 9.2 " Additionally, in the wake of such
strong action by the U.S. government, the Chinese government would be
likely to tighten political controls over its people to discourage pro-
democracy sentiments.= This response of increased political control has
been the response of the Cuban government toward its people since
passage of the Helms-Burton Act."2 This argument takes into account
that Chinese intellectuals within China oppose use of sanctions by the
United States.' Likewise, U.S. policy makers should take into account
the fact that dissidents within Cuba oppose embargo measures such as the
Helms-Burton Act.223
U.S. policy makers also argue that once the United States has
decreased economic relations with China by denying MFN status, one of
the "best avenue[s] of influence" will be missing. 2 There will no lon-
ger be U.S. business people present in China to set good examples.'
215 See Harding, supra note 4, at 266.
2,6 See China MFN Policy, supra note 185, at 438 (statement by Sen. John C.
Danforth).
217 See supra Part V.C (discussing lost business opportunities for U.S. businesses in
Cuba). Although the economic stakes for U.S. business in China may financially be
greater than in Cuba, the loss of business opportunity in Cuba is still a prevalent
concern for U.S. business people. See Fedarko, supra note 34.
2,8 See HARDING, supra note 4, at 267.
219 See id.
" See id.
' See supra notes 154-60 and .accompanying text (discussing increased repression
following passage of Helms-Burton).
m See HARDING, supra note 4, at 267.
" See Carter, supra note 155; Symington, supra note 155.
224 China MFN Policy, supra note 185, at 438 (statement by Sen. John C. Danforth).
2 See id.
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This same argument regarding the positive influence of U.S. presence has
been made in the context of the Cuban embargo debates.'
David M. Lampton, president of the National Committee on the
United States and China, advises that it is in the interests of the United
States to help China's economy to be successful.' Should China expe-
rience economic strife, Chinese migration would accelerate and cause
problems internationally.' In light of all the problems the United States
has experienced with masses of Cuban refugees, 9 it would be in the
interests of the United States to improve Cuba's economic conditions,
rather than strangle the Cuban economy through economic embargoes.
Finally, although Fidel Castro has not shown any signs of relinquish-
ing political power over Cuba, he has made some tentative steps toward
opening the Cuban economy.' It has been suggested that Cuba should
emulate China in instituting measures toward economic freedom while
retaining political control."' Sociological theories on the process of
democratization suggest that immediate democratization may not be the
most effective means to achieving lasting democracy.f 2 One such theory
suggests that perhaps "perestroika (economic and social reform) must
precede glasnost (political freedom). ' 3 According to this theory, certain
social requisites have to take place in order to have democracy. Eco-
nomic modernization is only one of such requisites.2' Non-democratic,
authoritarian rule that maintains stability may be necessary while the other
social requisites, such as cultural development and institutional growth,
are taking place.f 6 Thus, instead of democratization by means of an im-
mediate, but unstable, overthrow of the non-democratic system, lasting
democracy can occur through a gradual process of transitions.
Following from this theory is the conclusion that the reasonable
See Rep. Reed, supra note 13.
m See Lampton, supra note 164, at 59-60.
m See id.
, See George J. Church, Cubans, Go Home, TIME, Sept. 5, 1994, at 28; Bourque,
supra note 7, at 193-94.
See Fedarko, supra note 34; Church, supra note 229.
s See Church, supra note 229.
232 See Thomas A. Metzger, The U.S. Quest for Morality in Foreign Policy and the
Issue of Chinese Democratization, in GREATER CHINA AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: THE
CHoicE BETWEEN CONFRONTATION AND MUTuAL REsPEcr 84, 87 (Thomas A. Metzger
& Ramon H. Myers eds., 1996).
233 Id.
See id.
23 See id. at 88.
23 See id. at 87-89.
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approach to Cuba would be to adopt a policy along the lines of the
constructive engagement policy that has been pursued with China. Re-
establishing relations with Cuba by ending the embargo and engaging in
economic relations will lead to further opportunities to promote political
reforms through negotiations and dialogue.
VI. CONCLUSION
Engagement, particularly on an economic level, is a reasonable
means to work toward both economic and political reform in Cuba that
avoids harm to U.S. businesses and the Cuban people. Furthermore,
engagement with the Cuban government does not mean that victims of
expropriation have to forfeit their claims to the property that was taken
from them. Once the United States has engaged the Cuban government,
the doors will be open for more cooperative agreements addressing the
issue of compensation for victims of expropriation. Choosing an engage-
ment policy over isolationist policy will also resolve many of the con-
flicts the United States has with its allies over the extraterritorial applica-
tion of embargo laws, such as the Helms-Burton Act. A shift in policy
would help to bridge the impasse that has developed between the United
States and its allies.
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